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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78a-4-
104(2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct to hold that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact? 
2. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to defendants 
on the issue of proximate cause. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The court reviews facts and inferences from those facts in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, overturning summary judgment and remanding 
the case for further proceedings on issues if it concludes that genuine issue of 
material fact exist; where no material facts remain unresolved, the court 
examines the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness. 
English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154 (UT App. 1989), affirmed 848 P.2d 153 
(Utah 1993). 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 
On December 2, 2010, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of the district 
court's final Order Granting Summary Judgment, entered November 4, 2010 (R. 
456, 460). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sold their home and adjoining land in Washington County to 
Pecan Ridge Partners, LLC (hereinafter "Pecan Ridge") (R. 115, 362). In 
exchange, the plaintiffs received a trust deed on the property and other 
consideration (R. 115, 116, 362). 
Atlas Title Insurance Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Atlas Title") performed 
the closing on December 5, 2011 (R. 116). At that time, the Hardings executed a 
warranty deed to Pecan Ridge, and Pecan Ridge executed a first trust deed on the 
property in favor of a group of investors in the amount of $372,713.67, and a 
second trust deed in favor of the Hardings in the amount of $800,633.11 (R. 116, 
202, 214). The Hardings were told that their trust deed would be recorded the 
following day in second position (R. 116, 364). Atlas Title recorded the warranty 
deed and the first trust deed the following day, but failed to record the Harding's 
trust deed for more than nine months (R. 116,193, 202, 214). 
Before the trust deed was recorded, Pecan Ridge had encumbered the 
property with two additional trust deeds, recorded on May 7, 2007 and August 17, 
2007 (about the time Mr. Harding brought the failure to record the deed to Atlas 
Title's attention), to third parties with a principal balance of $1,391,000. Those 
trust deeds were also recorded by Atlas Title (R. 116, 218, 222). These additional 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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encumbrances completely destroyed the value of the Harding's security interest in 
the property (R. 367). 
Pecan Ridge thereafter traded the original parcel for a second piece of land. 
As part of the transaction, the plaintiffs received a trust deed in second position 
on this new property and released their trust deed on the original parcel (R. 117). 
The holder of the trust deed in first position foreclosed upon the property in March 
of 2009, extinguishing the plaintiffs trust deed (R. 120). 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Fifth District Court of Washington 
County, the on May 11, 2009 against Pecan Ridge and Atlas Title (R. 1). 
Plaintiffs served Pecan Ridge, Atlas Title and Pecan Ridge, as well as Randy 
Kidman and Dave White (employees of Atlas), and Jeremy Larkin and Scott 
Wilson (principals of Pecan Ridge) (R. 19, 23, 84, 85, 107, 318). Pecan Ridge did 
not file an answer and its default was entered and a judgment entered (R. 39, 104). 
Defendants Roger Cater (a former employee of Atlas Title) and Scott Nielson (a 
principal of Pecan Ridge) were not served. 
The amended complaint included claims for breach of contract against 
Pecan Ridge, breach of contact against Atlas Title, breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty against Atlas Title, civil conspiracy, negligence 
against Atlas Title and conversion (R. 54). 
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The Hardings requested a jury trial (R. 41). 
After discovery was completed, the defendants filed two motions for 
summary judgment (R i l l , 125)1. The first motion was in regard to the 
conspiracy claims (the Hardings do not contest the dismissal of this claim). The 
second motion sought dismissal of the remaining claims on the issue of proximate 
cause. The trial court granted both motions and the plaintiffs appealed (R. 456, 
460). 
The trial court, in its order, held that "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact that might preclude entry of summary judgment and that summary 
judgment is appropriate as a matter of law." (R. 457). With respect to the 
proximate cause issue, the trial court held that: 
Specifically, it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove, with respect to all of 
their claims, that the Title Defendants' actions were the proximate 
cause of Plaintiff s damages. Plaintiffs did not meet this burden 
because determining causation on the facts and evidence presented to 
the court could not be done without engaging in impermissible 
speculation. (R. 457). 
> 
On appeal, the Hardings are not disputing the dismissal of the conspiracy claim, 
and only seek a review of the proximate cause ruling. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. INITIAL SALE AND FAILURE TO RECORD TRUST DEED 
1
 The motion was filed by defendants Atlas Title, Kidman and White; defendants 
Wilson and Larkin joined in the motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy 
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Lynn and Eileen Harding owned property located in Washington County 
containing approximately 10 acres. They lived in a home on the property and 
conducted their horse business there (R. 115, 362, 375). 
The Hardings agreed to sell their home and property to Pecan Ridge, a real 
estate development group. The Hardings financed a large portion of the purchase 
price for the Initial Property (R. 115). Atlas Title Insurance Company, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Atlas Title") performed the closing on December 5, 2011 (R. 116). 
At that time, the Hardings executed a warranty deed to Pecan Ridge. Pecan Ridge 
executed a first trust deed on the property in favor of a group of investors in the 
amount of $372,713.67, and a second trust deed in favor of the Hardings in the 
amount of $800,633.11 (R. 116, 202, 214). The Hardings were told that their 
trust deed would be recorded the following day in second position (R. 116, 364). 
Atlas Title recorded the warranty deed and the first trust deed the following day, 
but failed to record the Harding's trust deed for more than nine months (R. 116, 
193,202,214). 
The Harding attempted to obtain a copy of the papers from the closing and 
the recorded deed from Atlas Title during that nine month period, and were told 
that the papers would be provided. Finally, Mr. Harding went to the County 
recorder in August of 2007 and discovered that the trust deed had not been 
claim (R. 347). 
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recorded (R. 117, 364, 365). After bringing this to Atlas Title's attention, the 
Harding's trust deed was finally recorded on September 11, 2007 (R. 117, 366, 
367). 
Before the Harding's trust deed was recorded, Pecan Ridge had encumbered 
the property with two additional trust deeds, recorded on May 7, 2007 and August 
17, 2007 (about the time Mr. Harding brought the failure to record the deed to 
Atlas Title's attention), to third parties. The principal balance of these two 
intervening trust deeds was $1,391,000. Those trust deeds were also recorded by 
Atlas Title (R. 116, 218,222). These additional encumbrances completely 
destroyed the value of the Harding's security interest in the property (R.367). 
2. TRANSACTIONS FOLLOWING RECORDING OF TRUST 
DEED 
As part of a separate transaction, not related to the sale of the original 
parcel, plaintiff Pecan Ridge executed a second trust deed and note in favor of the 
Hardings (R. 117, 367). The Harding's second note had a principal balance of 
$750,000, and the trust deed was recorded on a second parcel of property on 
September 27, 2011 (R. 117). 
In April of 2008, Pecan Ridge engaged in a real estate exchange whereby it 
transferred the two properties encumbered by the Harding's trust deeds in 
exchange for a third parcel (R. 117). The Harding received a trust deed and note 
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on this third parcel, with a principal balance of $1,550,633.10, the total unpaid 
balance of the two prior trust deed notes (R. 117, 118). The Hardings understood 
that their new trust deed would be in second position on the new property (R. 
118). 
The Hardings executed requests for reconveyance of the two prior trust 
deeds at that time, and Atlas Title, as trustee, executed and recorded the 
reconveyances (R. 117, 253, 256). 
The Pecan Ridge development failed, perhaps due in part due to the 
collapsing real estate market in Washington County, and the trust deed in superior 
position to plaintiffs' final trust deed was foreclosed in March of 2009 (R. 119, 
120), eliminating the Harding's secured interest in the third property. The 
Hardings filed this action two months later (R. 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court failed to recognize that there are genuine issues of material 
fact with respect to at least three of defendant's factual assertions. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation as it 
essentially decided that there may were other contributing factors to the Hardings' 
loss. Rather than requiring the defendant to prove that Atlas Title's neglect was 
not a possible cause of the Hardings' injury, the trial court instead essentially 
required the Hardings to show that Atlas Title's neglect was the sole cause of the 
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loss. Case law in Utah prohibits trial courts from deciding the issue of causation 
on such a basis. 
ARGUMENT 
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment procedure is generally considered drastic remedy, 
should be granted with reluctance and requires strict compliance with rule 
authorizing it. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 
1993); Houslv v. Anaconda Co., 427 P.2d 390 (Utah 1967). Summary judgment is 
a drastic remedy and courts should be reluctant to deprive litigants of an 
opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a trial, and therefore, summary 
judgment should be granted only when under the facts viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law. Welchman v. 
Wood, 337 P.2d 410 (Utah 1959). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and 
should be granted with reluctance. Houslev v. Anaconda Co.. 427 P.2d 390 (Utah 
1967). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Gardner v. Board of County Com'rs of Wasatch County, 178 P.3d 893 (Utah 
2008). Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to court before judgment 
can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from evidence before court that 
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party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. Drvsdale v. Ford 
Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997). In view of constitutional guarantee of 
access to the courts for protection of rights and redress of wrongs, summary 
judgment, which denies opportunity for trial, should be granted only when it 
clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against 
could prevail. Utah Const. Art. 1, § 11. Utah State University of Agriculture and 
Applied Science v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) 
It is not purpose of summary judgment procedure to judge credibility of 
averments of parties or witnesses, or the weight of evidence, nor is it to deny 
parties right to trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & 
Fielding. 1996, 909 P.2d 1283, certiorari denied 919 P.2d 1208. If there is any 
dispute as to any issue material to settlement of controversy, summary judgment 
should not be granted. Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
The judge hearing a summary judgment motion may not draw fact 
inferences as to the moving party's purpose or intention; such inferences may only 
be drawn at trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). Goodnow v. Sullivan, 44 P.3d 704 
(Utah 2002). Contentions of the party opposing the motion must be considered in 
a light most advantageous to him and go to trial. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. 
Harriman. 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). Essentially, summary judgment is only 
appropriate when it is clear from the undisputed facts that the opposing party 
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cannot prevail. Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court gives no 
deference to the district court's conclusions of law, and reviews them for 
correctness. Grvnberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003). 
B. DISPUTED FACTS 
Despite the assertion of the trial court to the contrary, there were material 
facts presented by Atlas Title that were disputed by the Hardings. While the facts 
given in paragraphs 4 of Atlas Title's motion was disputed, they are not 
necessarily material. Only an inference was disputed in paragraph 12 of Atlas 
Title's facts. However, the facts and inferences from the facts set forth below 
were disputed and were material. 
1. FACT #6 
Atlas Title's undisputed fact number six provided that: 
The Hardings' trust deed note was to be secured by a trust deed 
recorded against the Initial Property. The Hardings did not provide 
Atlas Title with written recording instructions regarding the recording 
of the trust deed against the Initial Property. 
(R. 116). The Hardings responded as follows: 
Plaintiffs deny the second sentence of this paragraph. First, 
plaintiffs object that the citations to the record do not support that 
conclusion. The Trust Deed would not contain any closing 
instructions, and Request No. 70 of Exhibit 9 is a response to request 
for admissions, unverified and not given in the form of an unsworn 
declaration, and is therefore hearsay. Denying a request for 
admission is not evidence. 
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Plaintiffs assert that they did provide closing instructions, and 
state as additional facts that they were assured by Atlas Title that the 
recording would take place the morning after the closing: 
a. At closing, plaintiffs signed a document which included 
recording instructions. It was prepared by Atlas Title. It said that 
their trust deed was to be recorded within 72 hours. Plaintiffs were 
verbally told by the Atlas representative that it would take 
approximately 3 days to get the recorded deed back to them. They 
were told Atlas Title that it would actually be recorded in the morning 
following the closing. Atlas Title told plaintiffs that they were going 
to give plaintiffs copies of these documents, as well as the title policy 
and many other documents they signed, within three days. 
b. Plaintiffs were charged for a title policy. See 
defendant's exhibit 6, line 1108. Plaintiffs were also told by Atlas 
Title in a letter that Atlas had provided title insurance. 
c. Plaintiffs requested in discovery that Atlas admit that tile 
insurance was provided, which Atlas denied, and requested a copy of 
these closing documents as well as the title policy. See Defendant 
Atlas Title's Insurance Agency, Inc., Answer to Plaintiffs First 
Discovery Request, response to request for admissions #3 and 
response to request for production of documents #17, 18, 19 and 20. 
Atlas provided nothing. 
(R. 362-3). It is clear from this evidence that Atlas Title as provided closing 
instructions, but did not give copies to the Hardings. 
2. FACT #8 
Atlas Title's undisputed fact number eight provided that: 
The Hardings trust deed was to be recorded after the Goodman et al. 
trust deed, in second lien position on the Initial Property, but-through 
inadvertence-it was not immediately recorded by Atlas Title. 
(R. 116). The Hardings responded as follows: 
Plaintiffs deny that it was through inadvertence that the trust deed was not 
immediately recorded by Atlas Title. The citations to the record do not 
support that conclusion. The Trust Deed does not contain any information 
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on why the trust deed was not recorded for nine months, and the response to 
interrogatories states that "As best at Atlas Title can tell, it was inadvertence 
on the part of the employee whose duty it was to record documents for Atlas 
Title." That is not evidence that it was inadvertence, only a statement of 
probability or a guess. 
Plaintiffs assert that it was not inadvertence with the following facts: 
a. The first position trust deed was recorded the day following the 
closing, September 6, 2007, just plaintiffs were told their trust deed would be 
recorded the following day. 
b. Three days after the closing, Lynn Harding called Atlas title to see if he 
could come and pick up the deed. They said they did not have it yet but they 
would get it to the Hardings. 
c. Two weeks after the closing, Lynn Harding went to Atlas Title. 
Someone new was in the office, and they said they would have to wait to get 
back to the Hardings until the person in charge was back from Christmas 
vacation. 
d. Eileen Harding called Atlas Title during the second week in January. 
She was told that Atlas would get a copy to the Hardings. 
e. After that, Lynn Harding called Atlas Title eight or ten times, 
approximately once per month, to get a copy of the recorded deed. They told 
him every time that they would get it to him. 
f. Eileen Harding stopped by twice at the Atlas Office to get a copy of the 
recorded deed, and was told that it would be sent to the Hardings. 
g. Lynn Harding stopped by the Atlas Office approximately six times, and 
was told that the deed would be sent to the Hardings. He remembers talking 
to Randy Kidman in particular on several occasions. 
h. Lynn Harding was at the title company as part of transactions with 
adjoining properties, and always requested a copy of the recorded deed. 
i. There were various excuses given for why the deed could not be 
provided by Atlas, including that they couldn't find the right file, that Randy 
was on vacation, that the file was not at that office, or that the guy who 
records the documents had the file with him. 
j . Finally, Lynn Harding went to the county recorder to just get a copy of 
the recorded deed in late August of 2007. At that time he found out that the 
deed had not been recorded. 
k. Lynn Harding immediately went to Atlas Title. Lynn Harding was 
told that it was a slip-up and that they would take care of it. At that time, 
Lynn Harding asked for titled his title insurance and closing instructions, and 
was told that they didn't have a copy of either document. 
1. Eileen Harding called during the first week in September, asking for a 
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copy of the deed. Atlas Title said they would fax it to her. 
m. Eilenn Harding called the following week, and the recorded deed was 
faxed to her the next day. 
n. There were additional deeds recorded on the "Initial Property" between 
the time of the Hardings' closing and when their trust deed was finally 
recorded. See defendant's exhibit #12 and 13. These closings were 
performed by Atlas Title and Atlas Title served as the Trustee of the trust 
deeds. As stated above, the Hardings requested copies of the closing 
documents in discovery for these transactions, and Atlas did not provide 
them. 
(R. 363-5) While the Hardings can point to no conclusive evidence that the failure 
to record the deed was intentional, there clearly is enough evidence, and 
inferences from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Hardings, to conclude that the failure to record the deed was more than 
inadvertence. 
3. FACT #10 
Atlas Title's undisputed fact number ten provided that: 
Sometime in August or September 2007, the Hardings brought it to 
Atlas Title's attention that their trust deed was not recorded. After 
confirming this, Atlas Title immediately recorded the trust deed. 
(R. 117). The Hardings responded as follows: 
Plaintiffs deny the second sentence of this paragraph. First, 
plaintiffs object that the citations to the record do not support that 
conclusion. The Trust Deed would not contain any information 
regarding when the Hardings found out that their trust deed had not 
been recorded, and paragraph 65 of Exhibit 9 is a response to request 
for admissions, unverified and not given in the form of an unsworn 
declaration, and is therefore hearsay. Denying a request for 
admission is not evidence. Further, the response states that: 
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Atlas Title was not made aware of the failure to record until it was 
brought to their attention by Plaitniff Lynn Harding sometime in 
September 2007. Therefore, Atlas Title must deny because it did not 
notify Plainiff of the recording issue. Nowhere in this statement does 
it state the recording took place immediately after Atlas was notified 
of the problem. 
Plaintiffs assert that the deed was not immediately recorded 
after the problem was brought to Atlas' attention with the following 
facts: 
a. Lynn Harding went to the county recorder to just get a 
copy of the recorded deed in late August of 2007. At that time he 
found out that the deed had not been recorded. 
b. Lynn Harding immediately went to Atlas Title. Lynn 
Harding was told that it was a slip-up and that they would take care of 
it. 
c. Eileen Harding called during the first week in September, 
asking for a copy of the deed. Atlas Title said they would fax it to her. 
d. Eilenn Harding called the following week, and the 
recorded deed was faxed to her the next day. 
(R. 366, 367). The trust deed was eventually recorded a couple of weeks after 
Mr. Harding contacted Atlas Title, but it was not done "immediately." 
C. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. COURTS DISFAVOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Utah case law is replete with warnings to trial courts against granting 
summary judgment on the issue of causation. 
Generally, the question of proximate cause raises an issue of fact "to be 
submitted to the jury for its determination." Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.. 607 P.2d 
240, 245-6 (Utah 1985). It is well established that the question of proximate cause 
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is generally reserved for the jury. Godeskv v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 544 
(Utah 1984); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 
App.1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Only in rare cases may a trial 
judge rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation. Steffensen v. 
Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991). 
Summary judgments are more frequently given in contract cases 
because of greater ease in determining the factual issues.... 
However, when it comes to determining negligence, contributory 
negligence, and causation, courts are not in such a good position . . . 
here enters prerogative of the jury to make a determination . . . Did 
the conduct of a party measure up to that of the reasonably prudent 
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause of the harm done? 
Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 at 128 (Utah 1967). 
Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and continuous 
sequence (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury. 
Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 83 P.3d 391 at 14 (UT App. 2003). The 
proximate cause in this case is Atlas Title's failure to record the deed. That 
was the event which produced the injury. That "a trial judge ordinarily 
may not determine the issue of proximate cause is fully supported by Utah 
case law." Id. at 3 (Utah App. 2003) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
Although summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in cases 
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where proximate cause is an issue, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). As the Court of Appeals 
recited in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (UT App. 2001), 
1292: 
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate 
cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon 
which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment 
appropriate." Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah App.) 
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). In other 
words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation 
on summary judgment. 
Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action. In 
Utah, "[pjroximate causation is '[t]hat cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred.' " Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 106 (citations omitted). To 
establish causation, plaintiffs must persuade a fact finder that their 
injury was a natural result of the defendant's breach. Plaintiffs 
therefore must spin together myriad facts into a durable thread that 
reasonably connects defendant's breach to plaintiffs' injury. Utah 
courts have recognized that "[fjact-sensitive cases ... do not lend 
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995). " 
The Supreme Court held in Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992) 
reversed summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause "[bjecause proximate 
cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from the jury if there is any evidence 
upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation." (emphasis added). 
Summary judgment on the issue of causation is not possible even where a 
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third-party criminal actor intervenes. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury. Inc.. 
909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996) (determining that when car dealership has 
history of thefts and yet continues to keep keys in cars and does nothing to 
improve security, it may be foreseeable that a thief would steal a car, drive 
recklessly while being pursued by police, and injure a bystander); Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters.. 697 P.2d 240,246-47 (Utah 1985) (holding on proper facts hotel's 
inaction in providing security could be proximate cause of wrongful death of 
patron killed by intruder); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 
489 (Utah App.1991) (concluding injury to customer during chase of shoplifter 
could be a foreseeable consequence of negligent training of personnel in pursuit of 
shoplifters), aff d, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
In Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363 
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant summary judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause in an action where the plaintiff had been injured in an automobile 
accident. The plaintiff claimed he was unable to see approaching traffic in 
executing a left-hand turn because a van owned by the defendant utility company 
negligently blocked his view by remaining in the intersection, and this was an 
intervening proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause. The court held 
that the issue of proximate cause may only be taken from the jury where 
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reasonable minds could not differ as to what "was or was not the proximate cause 
of the injury." Id. at 365 n. 4. The court concluded that" in a situation involving 
independent intervening cause, the primary issue is one of the foreseeability of the 
subsequent negligent conduct of a third person, and in this case, [the issue of 
proximate cause] must be resolved by the finder of fact." Id at 365. 
In Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), the 
passenger of a jeep brought an action against a bus company and the jeep driver 
for injuries sustained in a traffic accident. The trial court granted the bus company 
a directed verdict, instructing the jury that if they found the jeep driver should 
have observed the bus prior to the accident, they must find, as a matter of law, that 
the jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, the 
plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer that the bus negligently contributed to the 
accident and pointed to allegations that the bus stopped too rapidly, failed to drive 
out of the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights. Id. at 220. The Utah Supreme 
Court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the directed verdict. The Harris court 
held it improper for the trial judge to have taken the issue of proximate cause from 
the jury. The court explained: "Where the evidence is in dispute including the 
inferences from the evidence, the issue should be submitted to the jury." Id 
2. IMPERMISSIBLE SPECULATION 
Atlas Title and the court seemed to rely principally on language form the the 
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case ofHalinev. Barker. 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). In that case, the plaintiff 
brought an action against his bankruptcy attorneys for malpractice, as a 
bankruptcy court had refused to discharge in bankruptcy due to omissions and 
inaccuracies in his submissions to the court. The court there held that the issue of 
proximate cause could be decided by summary judgment in certain limited 
circumstances: 
proximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of law when a 
determination of the facts falls on either of two opposite ends of a 
factual continuum. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate (i) when 
the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about 
the underlying facts or about the application of a legal standard to the 
facts, and (ii) when the proximate cause of an injury is left to 
speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law. 
Harline v. Barker 912 P.2d 433 at 439 (Utah 1996). See also Berenda v. Langford 
914 P.2d 45 Utah 1996. Trial courts are not permitted to speculate about the facts, 
but must take them as they find them. 
However, the basis for the right must be evident from the facts as they exist. 
Glover cannot establish the basis for the right by merely speculating that 
under a different organizational structure the BSA and the Council could 
have retained the right to control scoutmasters at regular troop meetings. 
Such speculation is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for 
purposes of a summary judgment motion. 
Glover by and through Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Ameirca, 923 P.2d 1383 (utah 
1996). 
At the hearing, counsel for Atlas Title argued that the Hardings should not 
recover because of the economy collapsed ("That's the proximate cause of their 
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damages") (Transcript, 21). He also stated that the Hardings should have 
submitted a claim to Atlas Title's underwriter at the time the initial failure to 
record the deed was discovered, instead of later relinquishing their trust deed 
(Transcript, 22)2. Essentially, the Harding's damages were caused by the larger 
economy or their own mistakes. This is an interesting argument that should be 
made to the jury, but which is exactly the 'impermissible speculation" that the 
Harline case prohibits. Clearly, the economy did suffer, but what role that has in 
this action needs to be proved to a jury. Just as clearly, the Hardings should have 
obtained counsel and taken action sooner to recover for their losses. However, 
they would not have been in that position but for the failures of Atlas Title to 
record the deed. If the Hardings failed to mitigate damages or contributed to the 
loss, the jury needs to determine the extent of the Harding's fault and what effect 
that has on damages. 
Harline essentially argues that there is not causation where the action of the 
defendant had no impact on the injury. The trial court's interpretation seems to be 
that there is no causation where there may be other factors that led to the injury. 
Harline is clear that summary judgment is not appropriate in these circumstances. 
2
 This was not really possible, as Atlas Title did not provide copies of the tile 
policy or any other documents to the Hardings, despite their repeated requests. 
Atlas denied in discovery that it provided insurance for the transaction, even 
though it charged the Hardings for insurance in the closing, and did not provide to 
the Hardings any information regarding the alleged insurance despite a request for 
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The trial court cannot decide which cause it feels was the primary one and rule on 
that basis on summary judgment, it can only grant summary judgment if the 
defendant's neglect was unrelated to the injury. 
That the trial court turned the burden on its head can be seen in the court's 
ruling. The court held that "it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove, with respect to all of 
their claims, that the Title Defendants' actions were the proximate cause of 
Plaintiffs damages. (R. 457). This may be true at trial, but on summary judgment 
it is Atlas Title's burden to show that the Atlas Title was not the proximate cause 
of the injury. This was simply not possible under Utah law. 
Here, defendant Atlas Title failed to record a trust deed for nine months. In 
the interim, two other trust deeds were recorded on the property. This destroyed 
the value of the security (R. 367). The plaintiffs were presented with the 
opportunity to possibly recoup the damages they suffered, at least partially, due to 
Atlas Title's failure by moving their security interest to another property. As 
stated by the Hardings in response to the motion for summary judgment, they 
never would have released their original trust deed if it had been recorded in a 
timely manner (R. 367). But for Atlas Title's failure to record, the plaintiffs would 
never have agreed to release their deed. 
If they had been in second position on the original property as they should 
production of documents(R. 363-365). 
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have been, they would have had the resources to redeem the original property (R. 
367). They only released their original trust deed because it had become worthless 
due to Atlas Title's failure to record (R. 368). They attempted to collect the debt 
they were owed by moving it from the original property to another that might be of 
value, or least in the hope that moving the indebtedness would at least assist Pecan 
Ridge to recover and fulfill its obligations (R. 368). The effort nevertheless failed, 
but just because the Hardings' attempted to save their asset Atlas Title should not 
be allowed to escape liability for the problem it caused by failing to record the 
deed. 
D. NEGLECT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs' complaint includes a cause of action against Atlas Title for 
neglect. Summary judgment should be granted in such cases with great reluctance. 
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). Only in the most 
clear-cut cases is summary judgment appropriate in negligence matters. Ingram v. 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that the court reverse the trial court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment, and remand the case to the district court for jury 
trial. 
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Dated this 7th day of November, 2011. 
Samuel G. Draper, attorney for plaintiffs 
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Case No. 090501506 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants Atlas Title Insurance Agency, Inc., 
Randy Kidman, and Dave White (collectively "Title Defendants") motions for summary 
judgment addressing (i) all claims for lack of causation and (ii) the civil conspiracy claim on the 
merits. Defendants Scott Wilson and Jeremy Larkin joined in the Title Defendants' motion for 
partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Court held a hearing on the motions on October 19,2010. Having reviewed and 
considered the parties' memoranda and argument, the Court concludes that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact that might preclude entry of summary judgment and that summary 
judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Specifically, it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove, with 
respect to all of their claims, that the Title Defendants' actions were the proximate cause of 
Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs did not meet this burden because determining causation on the 
facts and evidence presented could not be done without engaging in impermissible speculation. 
Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to all claims asserted against the Title Defendants 
and Defendants Scott Wilson and Jeremy Larkin. Summary judgment is also appropriate as to 
Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy as no clear and convincing evidence has been produced on 
which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiffs meet each of the elements of a civil 
conspiracy. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment and 
dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against the Title Defendants, Scott Wilson, and Jeremy Larkin. 
DATED this 2 l 3 day o f 
2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
jAitfis'L. SHUMATE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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